{"schema_version":"0.1","map_id":"paper-10-map","publication_id":10,"publication_anchor":"paper-10","slug":"paper-10","canonical_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-10/","machine_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-10.json","root_node_id":"paper-10","stage":"mapped_draft","contribution_type_vocabulary_version":"0.1","contribution_types":["scheme"],"title":"Leveraging Social Contacts for Message Confidentiality in Delay Tolerant Networks","year":2009,"venue":"IEEE Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)","topic":"privacy-identity","labels":["Theory"],"authors":["Karim Eldefrawy","John Solis","Gene Tsudik"],"keywords":["delay-tolerant networks","social trust","confidential messaging"],"research_question":"How can a delay-tolerant-network sender confidentially address a recipient when it shares no key with that recipient, does not know the recipient's public key, and cannot afford an online lookup or multi-round handshake?","central_answer":"Route independent pseudorandom masking keys through multiple entities socially affiliated with the recipient. Each affiliated entity translates its key material into a form the recipient can recover, and the recipient removes all masks. Gateways extend the construction across regions; when no affiliated entity is known, a weaker split-message method trades interception probability against delay. Simulations and a social-network sample assess feasibility under an honest-but-curious model.","curation":{"drafted_at":"2026-07-11","drafted_by":[{"actor_type":"ai","name":"OpenAI Codex","role":"full-text extraction, evidence linking, and initial assessment"}],"method":"Full-source audit of the checked-in author-hosted paper and official IEEE DOI record.","source_scope":"full_source_audit","approval":{"status":"pending","note":"AI-drafted, source-linked map awaiting author verification before approval."}},"sources":[{"id":"source-paper-10-paper","type":"author_copy","title":"Leveraging Social Contacts for Message Confidentiality in Delay Tolerant Networks","url":"/pubs/2009/social-contacts-dtn-compsac2009.pdf","media_type":"application/pdf","sha256":"ed9c55eba1833234e909debc79fbddbdd180ea18c9f9f9d2df7e7bd997273973","page_count":9,"provenance_category":"author","version_note":"Author-hosted conference paper; local copy checked 2026-07-11."},{"id":"source-paper-10-author","type":"author_copy_origin","title":"Author-hosted PDF","url":"https://www.johnsolis.com/publications/dtn_compsac09.pdf"},{"id":"source-paper-10-official","type":"official_publication_record","title":"IEEE DOI record","url":"https://doi.org/10.1109/COMPSAC.2009.43"},{"id":"source-paper-10-citations","type":"citation_search","title":"Dated scholarly-web citation search","url":"https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22Leveraging+Social+Contacts+for+Message+Confidentiality+in+Delay+Tolerant+Networks%22","version_note":"Search attempted 2026-07-11; no transparent citation count was retrievable in this environment."}],"source_anchors":[{"id":"anchor-paper-10-problem","source_id":"source-paper-10-paper","label":"Motivation, problem, and contribution","locator":"Abstract and Sections I-II, PDF pages 1-2","url":"/pubs/2009/social-contacts-dtn-compsac2009.pdf#page=1"},{"id":"anchor-paper-10-model","source_id":"source-paper-10-paper","label":"Network model and assumptions","locator":"Section III, PDF pages 2-3","url":"/pubs/2009/social-contacts-dtn-compsac2009.pdf#page=2"},{"id":"anchor-paper-10-intra","source_id":"source-paper-10-paper","label":"Affiliated-entity intra-region scheme","locator":"Section IV-A, PDF pages 3-4","url":"/pubs/2009/social-contacts-dtn-compsac2009.pdf#page=3"},{"id":"anchor-paper-10-poor","source_id":"source-paper-10-paper","label":"Fallback split-message approach","locator":"Section IV-B, PDF pages 4-5","url":"/pubs/2009/social-contacts-dtn-compsac2009.pdf#page=4"},{"id":"anchor-paper-10-inter","source_id":"source-paper-10-paper","label":"Inter-region gateway extension","locator":"Section V, PDF pages 5-6","url":"/pubs/2009/social-contacts-dtn-compsac2009.pdf#page=5"},{"id":"anchor-paper-10-simulation","source_id":"source-paper-10-paper","label":"ONE simulation design and interception results","locator":"Section VI-A and Tables II-III, PDF pages 6-7","url":"/pubs/2009/social-contacts-dtn-compsac2009.pdf#page=6"},{"id":"anchor-paper-10-social","source_id":"source-paper-10-paper","label":"Facebook social-reach sample","locator":"Section VI-B and Figures 2-3, PDF pages 7-8","url":"/pubs/2009/social-contacts-dtn-compsac2009.pdf#page=7"},{"id":"anchor-paper-10-security","source_id":"source-paper-10-paper","label":"Informal security analysis and limitations","locator":"Section VII, PDF pages 7-8","url":"/pubs/2009/social-contacts-dtn-compsac2009.pdf#page=7"},{"id":"anchor-paper-10-conclusion","source_id":"source-paper-10-paper","label":"Conclusion and future work","locator":"Section IX, PDF page 8","url":"/pubs/2009/social-contacts-dtn-compsac2009.pdf#page=8"},{"id":"anchor-paper-10-provenance","source_id":"source-paper-10-author","label":"Author-copy provenance","locator":"Public author-hosted PDF","url":"https://www.johnsolis.com/publications/dtn_compsac09.pdf"},{"id":"anchor-paper-10-publication","source_id":"source-paper-10-official","label":"Official publication metadata","locator":"DOI 10.1109/COMPSAC.2009.43","url":"https://doi.org/10.1109/COMPSAC.2009.43"},{"id":"anchor-paper-10-citation-search","source_id":"source-paper-10-citations","label":"Citation search attempted","locator":"Exact-title search, 2026-07-11; no verified count retrieved","url":"https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22Leveraging+Social+Contacts+for+Message+Confidentiality+in+Delay+Tolerant+Networks%22"}],"nodes":[{"id":"paper-10","kind":"paper","parent_id":null,"order":1,"epistemic_status":"published","title":"Leveraging Social Contacts for Message Confidentiality in DTNs","summary":"A confidential-messaging scheme that substitutes recipient-affiliated intermediaries for unavailable end-to-end key discovery in intermittently connected networks.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-problem","anchor-paper-10-publication"]},{"id":"paper-10-question","kind":"question","parent_id":"paper-10","order":1,"epistemic_status":"research_question","title":"Research question","summary":"How can a sender encrypt its first message to a recipient with no shared security context and no dependable online infrastructure?","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-problem"]},{"id":"paper-10-answer","kind":"contribution","parent_id":"paper-10","order":2,"epistemic_status":"proposed_and_simulated","title":"Central answer","summary":"Use two or more socially affiliated entities as independent key-translation points, so only the destination can combine all pseudorandom masks and recover the message.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-intra","anchor-paper-10-simulation"]},{"id":"paper-10-model","kind":"model","parent_id":"paper-10","order":3,"epistemic_status":"explicitly_scoped","title":"Regional DTN model","summary":"Mobile nodes communicate opportunistically within regions; fixed gateways connect regions. Nodes know keys for selected affiliated entities, and those entities are assumed to know or share a key with the destination.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-model","anchor-paper-10-intra"]},{"id":"paper-10-intra","kind":"scheme","parent_id":"paper-10","order":4,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"Intra-region affiliated-entity scheme","summary":"The sender XOR-masks the message with PRF outputs under independent seeds and encrypts one seed to each AE. AEs re-encrypt their seed for the destination; AE traversal order may vary and replicated paths may collectively visit all AEs.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-intra"]},{"id":"paper-10-inter","kind":"scheme","parent_id":"paper-10","order":5,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"Inter-region extension","summary":"Source- and destination-region gateways translate an additional masking seed between regional trust domains, providing a second layer when only one ordinary AE is available.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-inter"]},{"id":"paper-10-poor","kind":"fallback","parent_id":"paper-10","order":6,"epistemic_status":"heuristic","title":"Poor Man's Approach","summary":"If no AE is known, the sender separates ciphertext and key shares across different routes and delays. Confidentiality is probabilistic: any intermediary that gathers all components recovers the message.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-poor"]},{"id":"paper-10-threat","kind":"threat_model","parent_id":"paper-10","order":7,"epistemic_status":"explicitly_scoped","title":"Honest-but-curious intermediaries","summary":"Nodes follow routing behavior but may retain and correlate messages beyond TTL. Active modification, dropping, and origin authentication are outside the primary model; AE collusion is the central confidentiality threat.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-security"]},{"id":"paper-10-evidence","kind":"evidence_group","parent_id":"paper-10","order":8,"epistemic_status":"simulation_and_observational_sample","title":"Feasibility evidence","summary":"ONE simulations model 250 pedestrians on a Helsinki map with epidemic routing, while samples of 870 Orange County and 900 Egypt Facebook users estimate friend/friend-of-friend reach.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-simulation","anchor-paper-10-social"]},{"id":"paper-10-result","kind":"result","parent_id":"paper-10-evidence","order":1,"epistemic_status":"simulation_supported","title":"Delay, path length, and interception","summary":"For the fallback scheme, longer intra-region separation lowers measured interception but raises latency; in inter-region runs, more hops increase exposure and retained copies weaken the benefit of delay.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-simulation"]},{"id":"paper-10-social-result","kind":"result","parent_id":"paper-10-evidence","order":2,"epistemic_status":"observational_sample","title":"Social reach","summary":"The sampled public profiles suggest that tens to hundreds of direct contacts can expose thousands of friends-of-friends, but closed profiles are omitted and the two convenience samples do not establish a general population distribution.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-social"]},{"id":"paper-10-boundaries","kind":"limitation_group","parent_id":"paper-10","order":9,"epistemic_status":"material","title":"Security and scalability boundaries","summary":"Security is informal; multiple AEs must not collude, the sender must know their keys, and each AE must know the destination key. The paper itself flags the latter assumption as potentially unscalable and leaves formal analysis for future work.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-security","anchor-paper-10-conclusion"]},{"id":"paper-10-artifacts","kind":"artifact","parent_id":"paper-10","order":10,"epistemic_status":"paper_available_no_code","title":"Artifacts","summary":"A fixed author copy is available locally; ONE configurations, simulation outputs, and the historical social-network sample were not located.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-simulation","anchor-paper-10-social","anchor-paper-10-provenance"]},{"id":"paper-10-scrutiny","kind":"scrutiny","parent_id":"paper-10","order":11,"epistemic_status":"peer_reviewed","title":"Scrutiny","summary":"The work appeared at IEEE COMPSAC 2009 and explicitly labels its security assessment preliminary and informal; independent reproduction was not located.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-security","anchor-paper-10-publication"]}],"relations":[{"id":"paper-10-relation-model-frames-question","type":"contextualizes","from_id":"paper-10-model","to_id":"paper-10-question"},{"id":"paper-10-relation-intra-realizes-answer","type":"realizes","from_id":"paper-10-intra","to_id":"paper-10-answer"},{"id":"paper-10-relation-inter-extends-intra","type":"extends","from_id":"paper-10-inter","to_id":"paper-10-intra"},{"id":"paper-10-relation-poor-fallback","type":"alternative_to","from_id":"paper-10-poor","to_id":"paper-10-intra"},{"id":"paper-10-relation-threat-qualifies-answer","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-10-threat","to_id":"paper-10-answer"},{"id":"paper-10-relation-evidence-evaluates-answer","type":"evaluates","from_id":"paper-10-evidence","to_id":"paper-10-answer"},{"id":"paper-10-relation-boundaries-qualify-answer","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-10-boundaries","to_id":"paper-10-answer"}],"assessment":{"id":"paper-10-assessment-2026-07-11","rubric_version":"0.2","assessed_at":"2026-07-11","status":"ai_draft_author_review_pending","note":"These dimensions describe documented support and process, not truth, correctness, or a universal ranking. No composite score is calculated.","axes":[{"id":"epistemic_evidence","level":"medium","rationale":"The schemes are specified and evaluated with DTN simulations and a social-network sample, but the security analysis is explicitly informal and the key/collusion assumptions are not experimentally validated.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-intra","anchor-paper-10-inter","anchor-paper-10-simulation","anchor-paper-10-security"]},{"id":"auditability","level":"high","rationale":"A fixed author-hosted full text is checked in with page count and hash, making the constructions, evaluation, and stated limitations directly inspectable.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-provenance","anchor-paper-10-intra","anchor-paper-10-simulation","anchor-paper-10-security"]},{"id":"production_provenance","level":"medium","rationale":"Named authorship, author-copy provenance, official metadata, and simulation parameters are documented; roles, revision history, and artifact lineage are not.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-simulation","anchor-paper-10-provenance","anchor-paper-10-publication"]},{"id":"external_scrutiny","level":"medium","rationale":"The paper has an official full-conference publication record; no public reviews, formal verification, or independent reproduction was located.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-publication"]},{"id":"reception","level":"low","rationale":"No citations were verifiably located in the constrained dated search. Under the author's 0-8 rule this is low, but it is not a claim that the paper has no citations.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-citation-search"]},{"id":"contribution_significance","level":"medium","rationale":"The paper offers a concrete way to bootstrap confidentiality from social structure and studies its operational tradeoffs, but collusion and destination-key scalability constrain the supported claim.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-10-problem","anchor-paper-10-intra","anchor-paper-10-simulation","anchor-paper-10-security"]}]},"reception_snapshot":{"as_of":"2026-07-11","method":"Exact-title scholarly-web search; transparent index count unavailable","source":"Google Scholar query route plus general scholarly-web search","citation_count":0,"signals":[],"limitation":"Zero means no citations were verifiably located during this constrained search, not a total bibliometric count; author should replace it with a confirmed index snapshot."}}