{"schema_version":"0.1","map_id":"paper-15-map","publication_id":15,"publication_anchor":"paper-15","slug":"paper-15","canonical_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-15/","machine_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-15.json","root_node_id":"paper-15","stage":"mapped_draft","contribution_type_vocabulary_version":"0.1","contribution_types":["protocol"],"title":"Privacy-Preserving Location-Based On-Demand Routing in MANETs","year":2011,"venue":"IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Volume 29, Number 10","topic":"privacy-identity","labels":["Theory","Applied"],"authors":["Karim Eldefrawy","Gene Tsudik"],"keywords":["location privacy","MANET routing"],"research_question":"Can an on-demand MANET route be discovered toward a geographic destination area without requiring durable identities and while limiting what outsiders and insiders learn about the communicating nodes and network topology?","central_answer":"PRISM adapts AODV to location-centric addressing: a source floods a group-signed request containing a destination area and temporary key, and any node in that area can return an encrypted, group-signed reply over the reverse path. The design protects against outsiders and passive insiders under its cryptographic assumptions, but reveals the queried area and existence of a respondent and requires extensions to address active-insider location fraud and Sybil behavior.","curation":{"drafted_at":"2026-07-11","drafted_by":[{"actor_type":"ai","name":"OpenAI Codex","role":"full-text extraction, protocol and threat-model decomposition, evidence linking, and initial assessment"}],"method":"Source-grounded review of the complete checked-in journal paper, its publisher and archive records, and a dated ResearchGate citation snapshot. Simulations and security reasoning were inspected but not independently reproduced.","source_scope":"full_source_audit","approval":{"status":"pending","note":"AI-authored source-linked map awaiting author verification; technical summaries and ratings may be revised before approval."}},"sources":[{"id":"source-paper-15-paper","type":"scholarly_article","title":"Privacy-Preserving Location-Based On-Demand Routing in MANETs","url":"/pubs/2011/privacy-preserving-routing-jsac2011.pdf","media_type":"application/pdf","sha256":"ecc2b70f32c26a99c6a38b72aecc33c7920cb96d18a31ebeda08821d34baae31","page_count":10,"provenance_category":"author","retrieved_at":"2026-07-11","retrieved_from_url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20150703110555id_/http://www.ics.uci.edu/~keldefra/papers/jsac11.pdf"},{"id":"source-paper-15-official","type":"publication_record","title":"IEEE JSAC publisher record","url":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2011.111203"},{"id":"source-paper-15-citations","type":"citation_index_snapshot","title":"ResearchGate citation snapshot","url":"https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220641668_Privacy-Preserving_Location-Based_On-Demand_Routing_in_MANETs","retrieved_at":"2026-07-11"}],"source_anchors":[{"id":"anchor-paper-15-question","source_id":"source-paper-15-paper","label":"Problem, goals, and claimed contribution","locator":"Abstract and Sections I-II.A, PDF pages 1-2","url":"/pubs/2011/privacy-preserving-routing-jsac2011.pdf#page=1"},{"id":"anchor-paper-15-model","source_id":"source-paper-15-paper","label":"Location-centric model and assumptions","locator":"Sections II-III.A, PDF pages 2-3","url":"/pubs/2011/privacy-preserving-routing-jsac2011.pdf#page=2"},{"id":"anchor-paper-15-adversary","source_id":"source-paper-15-paper","label":"Outsider and insider adversary classes","locator":"Section III.B, PDF page 3","url":"/pubs/2011/privacy-preserving-routing-jsac2011.pdf#page=3"},{"id":"anchor-paper-15-protocol","source_id":"source-paper-15-paper","label":"PRISM route-request, route-reply, and forwarding protocol","locator":"Section IV.A-B and Figure 1, PDF pages 4-5","url":"/pubs/2011/privacy-preserving-routing-jsac2011.pdf#page=4"},{"id":"anchor-paper-15-security","source_id":"source-paper-15-paper","label":"Security and privacy analysis","locator":"Section IV.C-F, PDF pages 5-6","url":"/pubs/2011/privacy-preserving-routing-jsac2011.pdf#page=5"},{"id":"anchor-paper-15-simulation","source_id":"source-paper-15-paper","label":"Simulation setup and routing-overhead results","locator":"Section V.A-C, PDF pages 6-8","url":"/pubs/2011/privacy-preserving-routing-jsac2011.pdf#page=6"},{"id":"anchor-paper-15-leakage","source_id":"source-paper-15-paper","label":"Topology leakage and utility evaluation","locator":"Section V.D-E, PDF pages 8-9","url":"/pubs/2011/privacy-preserving-routing-jsac2011.pdf#page=8"},{"id":"anchor-paper-15-limitations","source_id":"source-paper-15-paper","label":"Limitations and conclusions","locator":"Sections IV and VII, PDF pages 5-6 and 9","url":"/pubs/2011/privacy-preserving-routing-jsac2011.pdf#page=9"},{"id":"anchor-paper-15-publication","source_id":"source-paper-15-official","label":"Official journal publication record","locator":"IEEE JSAC 29(10), DOI record","url":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2011.111203"},{"id":"anchor-paper-15-citations","source_id":"source-paper-15-citations","label":"Citation-count snapshot","locator":"ResearchGate displayed Citations (107), observed 2026-07-11; coverage and version merging may differ from other indexes.","url":"https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220641668_Privacy-Preserving_Location-Based_On-Demand_Routing_in_MANETs"}],"nodes":[{"id":"paper-15","kind":"paper","parent_id":null,"order":1,"epistemic_status":"published","title":"PRISM","summary":"An on-demand, location-addressed MANET routing protocol designed to reduce identity and topology leakage in hostile settings.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-question"]},{"id":"paper-15-question","kind":"question","parent_id":"paper-15","order":1,"epistemic_status":"research_question","title":"Research question","summary":"Can route discovery reach whichever authorized node occupies a target area without exposing a permanent source or destination identity?","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-question","anchor-paper-15-model"]},{"id":"paper-15-answer","kind":"contribution","parent_id":"paper-15","order":2,"epistemic_status":"analytically_and_empirically_supported","title":"Central answer","summary":"Use group-signed, identity-free route requests to a geographic area, temporary public keys for the reply, and short-lived route/session identifiers for data forwarding.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-protocol","anchor-paper-15-security"]},{"id":"paper-15-goals","kind":"scope","parent_id":"paper-15","order":3,"epistemic_status":"explicitly_scoped","title":"Design goals","summary":"PRISM targets tracking resistance, protection from active and passive outsiders and insiders, and acceptable routing cost in critical mobile networks.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-question"]},{"id":"paper-15-assumptions","kind":"assumption_group","parent_id":"paper-15-goals","order":1,"epistemic_status":"assumed","title":"Infrastructure and device assumptions","summary":"Nodes know their location, have loose time synchronization and public-key capabilities, and receive credentials and a network-wide key from an offline trusted authority; eviction is only supported between deployments.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-model"]},{"id":"paper-15-adversary","kind":"threat_model","parent_id":"paper-15-goals","order":2,"epistemic_status":"defined","title":"Adversary classes","summary":"The analysis separates passive and active outsiders from passive and active insiders; physical-layer time-difference tracking is explicitly outside the model.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-adversary"]},{"id":"paper-15-protocol","kind":"protocol","parent_id":"paper-15","order":4,"epistemic_status":"proposed","title":"PRISM route discovery","summary":"The source broadcasts a request containing the destination area, fresh temporary public key, timestamp, and group signature; nodes flood it while caching only request hashes and reverse-hop state.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-protocol"]},{"id":"paper-15-protocol-reply","kind":"protocol_step","parent_id":"paper-15-protocol","order":1,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"Anonymous route reply","summary":"A node in the destination area returns a group-signed reply that binds the request hash and encrypts a fresh session key and exact location to the source's temporary key.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-protocol"]},{"id":"paper-15-protocol-data","kind":"protocol_step","parent_id":"paper-15-protocol","order":2,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"Data phase","summary":"Short-lived route identifiers derived from request material guide forwarding, while the negotiated session key protects the end-to-end payload.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-protocol"]},{"id":"paper-15-claim-outsider","kind":"security_claim","parent_id":"paper-15","order":5,"epistemic_status":"conditional_analysis","title":"Outsider protection","summary":"The network-wide key and cryptographic authentication are intended to exclude outsiders from useful routing traffic and prevent request or reply forgery under the stated assumptions.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-security"]},{"id":"paper-15-claim-insider","kind":"privacy_claim","parent_id":"paper-15","order":6,"epistemic_status":"conditional_analysis","title":"Passive-insider privacy","summary":"Group-signature unlinkability and temporary keys hide durable identities, but an observer still learns the requested destination area and that some node there replied.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-security"]},{"id":"paper-15-boundary-active","kind":"limitation","parent_id":"paper-15","order":7,"epistemic_status":"explicitly_reported","title":"Active-insider boundary","summary":"Base PRISM does not prevent a credentialed insider from location fraud, Sybil behavior, or some man-in-the-middle actions; one-time certificates or tamper-resistant signing/location hardware are proposed extensions.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-security"]},{"id":"paper-15-evidence-overhead","kind":"empirical_evidence","parent_id":"paper-15","order":8,"epistemic_status":"simulation","title":"Routing-overhead evaluation","summary":"Simulations vary 20-100 nodes, query fractions, and three mobility models over repeated 10,000-second runs; overhead rises sharply under an intentionally heavy all-node, five-second query workload and is lower at moderate query rates.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-simulation"]},{"id":"paper-15-evidence-privacy","kind":"empirical_evidence","parent_id":"paper-15","order":9,"epistemic_status":"simulation","title":"Topology-leakage evaluation","summary":"The experiments estimate the fraction of topology exposed by observed route discoveries; leakage depends strongly on query volume and mobility, with group and time-variant mobility revealing less than random waypoint in the tested settings.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-leakage"]},{"id":"paper-15-limitations","kind":"limitation_group","parent_id":"paper-15","order":10,"epistemic_status":"material","title":"Trusted boundaries and leakage","summary":"The destination area and response event remain visible, physical tracking is out of scope, an offline authority and shared network key are trusted, and simulated performance does not establish behavior in a deployed hostile MANET.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-adversary","anchor-paper-15-security","anchor-paper-15-limitations"]},{"id":"paper-15-artifacts","kind":"artifact_group","parent_id":"paper-15","order":11,"epistemic_status":"paper_and_simulation_description","title":"Artifacts","summary":"The complete paper documents protocol formats, security reasoning, simulation parameters, and results; no simulation source, raw trace set, or implementation repository was located.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-protocol","anchor-paper-15-simulation"]},{"id":"paper-15-scrutiny","kind":"scrutiny","parent_id":"paper-15","order":12,"epistemic_status":"journal_reviewed","title":"External scrutiny and reception","summary":"The work appeared in IEEE JSAC and ResearchGate reports 107 citations; this audit did not inspect review reports, citing contexts, corrections, or an independent implementation.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-publication","anchor-paper-15-citations"]},{"id":"paper-15-lineage","kind":"lineage","parent_id":"paper-15","order":13,"epistemic_status":"documented","title":"Relation to ALARM","summary":"PRISM develops an on-demand counterpart to ALARM's proactive location-centric design, reducing routine topology dissemination while introducing query-dependent area leakage.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-question","anchor-paper-15-leakage"]}],"relations":[{"id":"paper-15-relation-reply-part-of-protocol","type":"part_of","from_id":"paper-15-protocol-reply","to_id":"paper-15-protocol"},{"id":"paper-15-relation-data-part-of-protocol","type":"part_of","from_id":"paper-15-protocol-data","to_id":"paper-15-protocol"},{"id":"paper-15-relation-protocol-supports-answer","type":"supports","from_id":"paper-15-protocol","to_id":"paper-15-answer"},{"id":"paper-15-relation-privacy-supports-answer","type":"supports","from_id":"paper-15-evidence-privacy","to_id":"paper-15-answer"},{"id":"paper-15-relation-active-qualifies-answer","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-15-boundary-active","to_id":"paper-15-answer"},{"id":"paper-15-relation-limitations-qualify-insider","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-15-limitations","to_id":"paper-15-claim-insider"}],"assessment":{"id":"paper-15-assessment-2026-07-11","rubric_version":"0.2","assessed_at":"2026-07-11","status":"ai_draft_author_review_pending","note":"These dimensions describe documented support and process, not truth, correctness, or a universal ranking. No composite score is calculated.","axes":[{"id":"epistemic_evidence","level":"medium","rationale":"The paper gives a concrete protocol, explicit adversary analysis, and repeated simulations of overhead and leakage across mobility models. The security argument is conditional, raw simulation artifacts are unavailable, and no deployment or independent reproduction was audited.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-protocol","anchor-paper-15-security","anchor-paper-15-simulation","anchor-paper-15-leakage"]},{"id":"auditability","level":"high","rationale":"A complete author copy is checked into the site with source route, page count, and SHA-256 identity. Protocol details and reported simulations are inspectable, although code and raw traces were not located.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-protocol","anchor-paper-15-simulation"]},{"id":"production_provenance","level":"medium","rationale":"Named authorship, an archived author copy, and the journal DOI establish baseline provenance. Contributor roles, simulation lineage, revision history, and tool use are not documented.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-question","anchor-paper-15-publication"]},{"id":"external_scrutiny","level":"medium","rationale":"IEEE JSAC publication and later citations demonstrate scrutiny and attention, but review reports, correction history, adversarial reanalysis, and independent reproduction were not located.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-publication","anchor-paper-15-citations"]},{"id":"reception","level":"high","rationale":"ResearchGate displayed 107 citations on 2026-07-11, exceeding the rubric's 11-citation high threshold. The count is index-specific and citation contexts were not audited.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-citations"]},{"id":"contribution_significance","level":"high","rationale":"The protocol develops a distinct location-centric, on-demand privacy design with quantified topology leakage and has a substantial citation trail, while retaining clear active-insider and infrastructure boundaries.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-15-question","anchor-paper-15-leakage","anchor-paper-15-limitations","anchor-paper-15-citations"]}]},"reception_snapshot":{"as_of":"2026-07-11","method":"researchgate_publication_page","citation_count":107,"source":"ResearchGate publication page","signals":["ResearchGate displayed Citations (107)."],"limitation":"ResearchGate coverage and version merging can differ from other indexes; citing contexts, polarity, implementations, and operational adoption were not audited."}}