{"schema_version":"0.1","map_id":"paper-3-map","publication_id":3,"publication_anchor":"paper-3","slug":"paper-3","canonical_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-3/","machine_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-3.json","root_node_id":"paper-3","stage":"mapped_draft","contribution_type_vocabulary_version":"0.1","contribution_types":["protocol"],"title":"PEUC-WiN: Privacy Enhancement by User Cooperation in Wireless Networks","year":2006,"venue":"Second IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols (NPSec)","topic":"privacy-identity","labels":["Applied"],"authors":["Karim Eldefrawy","Claudio Soriente"],"keywords":["location privacy","wireless networks","user cooperation"],"research_question":"Can WLAN users rotate link- and network-layer identifiers to resist access-point tracking without repeatedly reassociating, terminating TCP connections, or accepting the throughput loss of prior silent-period approaches?","central_answer":"PEUC-WiN synchronizes a group of users behind an untrusted access point so they permute a shared pool of IP/MAC pairs, while a trusted Privacy Enhancer proxies stable external connections and remaps them across each address rotation.","curation":{"drafted_at":"2026-07-11","drafted_by":[{"actor_type":"ai","name":"OpenAI Codex","role":"full-text extraction, evidence linking, and initial assessment"}],"method":"Full-source audit of the checked-in Internet Archive snapshot of the formerly public UCI author copy and the official IEEE DOI record.","source_scope":"full_source_audit","approval":{"status":"pending","note":"AI-drafted, source-linked map awaiting author verification before approval."}},"sources":[{"id":"source-paper-3-paper","type":"archived_author_copy","title":"PEUC-WiN: Privacy Enhancement by User Cooperation in Wireless Networks","url":"/pubs/2006/peuc-win-npsec2006.pdf","media_type":"application/pdf","sha256":"2543aaa0f4fe0538e6e1c88c04ae5622822d8c08cdd93558c514af6448dad86a","page_count":6,"provenance_category":"author","version_note":"Internet Archive snapshot dated 2015-07-03 of the formerly public UCI author PDF."},{"id":"source-paper-3-archive","type":"manuscript_archive","title":"Internet Archive capture of UCI author copy","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20150703110605/http://www.ics.uci.edu/%7Ekeldefra/papers/peucwin.pdf"},{"id":"source-paper-3-official","type":"official_publication_record","title":"IEEE DOI record","url":"https://doi.org/10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320345"},{"id":"source-paper-3-citations","type":"citation_search","title":"Dated scholarly-web citation search","url":"https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22PEUC-WiN%3A+Privacy+Enhancement+by+User+Cooperation+in+Wireless+Networks%22","version_note":"Search attempted 2026-07-11; no transparent citation count was retrievable in this environment."}],"source_anchors":[{"id":"anchor-paper-3-problem","source_id":"source-paper-3-paper","label":"Problem and claimed contribution","locator":"Abstract and Section 1, PDF page 1 (printed page 38)","url":"/pubs/2006/peuc-win-npsec2006.pdf#page=1"},{"id":"anchor-paper-3-model","source_id":"source-paper-3-paper","label":"Group, adversary, keys, and trusted Privacy Enhancer","locator":"Section 3, PDF pages 2-3 (printed pages 39-40)","url":"/pubs/2006/peuc-win-npsec2006.pdf#page=2"},{"id":"anchor-paper-3-protocol","source_id":"source-paper-3-paper","label":"Join, leave, update, address permutation, and proxy operation","locator":"Section 3, PDF pages 3-4 (printed pages 40-41)","url":"/pubs/2006/peuc-win-npsec2006.pdf#page=3"},{"id":"anchor-paper-3-security","source_id":"source-paper-3-paper","label":"Security analysis and anonymity conditions","locator":"Section 4, PDF page 4 (printed page 41)","url":"/pubs/2006/peuc-win-npsec2006.pdf#page=4"},{"id":"anchor-paper-3-performance","source_id":"source-paper-3-paper","label":"Performance model, implementation barrier, and simulation setup","locator":"Section 5, PDF pages 4-5 (printed pages 41-42)","url":"/pubs/2006/peuc-win-npsec2006.pdf#page=4"},{"id":"anchor-paper-3-results","source_id":"source-paper-3-paper","label":"NC-TUns throughput comparison","locator":"Section 5 and Figures 1-2, PDF pages 5-6 (printed pages 42-43)","url":"/pubs/2006/peuc-win-npsec2006.pdf#page=5"},{"id":"anchor-paper-3-conclusion","source_id":"source-paper-3-paper","label":"Conclusion and future work","locator":"Section 6, PDF page 6 (printed page 43)","url":"/pubs/2006/peuc-win-npsec2006.pdf#page=6"},{"id":"anchor-paper-3-archive","source_id":"source-paper-3-archive","label":"Author-copy provenance","locator":"Internet Archive capture 2015-07-03","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20150703110605/http://www.ics.uci.edu/%7Ekeldefra/papers/peucwin.pdf"},{"id":"anchor-paper-3-publication","source_id":"source-paper-3-official","label":"Official publication metadata","locator":"DOI 10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320345","url":"https://doi.org/10.1109/NPSEC.2006.320345"},{"id":"anchor-paper-3-citation-search","source_id":"source-paper-3-citations","label":"Citation search attempted","locator":"Exact-title search, 2026-07-11; 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the access point can observe all group traffic, while upper-layer payloads and control messages rely on public-key, signature, group-key, and IPsec protection.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-model","anchor-paper-3-security"]},{"id":"paper-3-scope-anonymity","kind":"assumption","parent_id":"paper-3-scope","order":1,"epistemic_status":"necessary_condition","title":"Anonymity-set condition","summary":"Privacy requires more than one participating user; the anonymity level grows with group cardinality, while shorter rotation slots reduce tracking time at the cost of more switching overhead.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-model","anchor-paper-3-security"]},{"id":"paper-3-protocol","kind":"protocol","parent_id":"paper-3","order":4,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"Cooperative address-rotation protocol","summary":"The protocol maintains group membership, distributes an address table and hash-chain seed, synchronizes rotations, and maps each user to a collision-free address pair for each variable-length time slot.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-protocol"]},{"id":"paper-3-protocol-control","kind":"component","parent_id":"paper-3-protocol","order":1,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"Membership and synchronization","summary":"Signed and encrypted join/leave messages let the Privacy Enhancer update group size, address table, seed, and time base; timers handle departures that are not explicitly announced.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-protocol"]},{"id":"paper-3-protocol-rotation","kind":"component","parent_id":"paper-3-protocol","order":2,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"Address permutation","summary":"All members derive the same time-slot hash value and use offset indices to permute the table of active IP/MAC pairs without collisions; a hash-derived variable slot length counters fixed-period timing correlation.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-protocol"]},{"id":"paper-3-protocol-proxy","kind":"component","parent_id":"paper-3-protocol","order":3,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"Privacy Enhancer proxy","summary":"The proxy exposes a stable permanent address to correspondent nodes, tracks both legs of each connection, and adjusts IP addresses, sequence numbers, acknowledgments, and windows as users exchange address pairs.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-protocol"]},{"id":"paper-3-claims","kind":"claim_group","parent_id":"paper-3","order":5,"epistemic_status":"mixed","title":"Principal claims","summary":"The paper gives an informal privacy analysis and simulation evidence about throughput disruption; it does not provide a formal security proof.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-security","anchor-paper-3-results"]},{"id":"paper-3-claim-privacy","kind":"claim","parent_id":"paper-3-claims","order":1,"epistemic_status":"informally_argued","title":"Upper-layer tracking resistance","summary":"Against an observer limited to layer 2 and above, synchronized address permutation prevents straightforward identifier linkage, conditional on encrypted communications, uncompromised group secrets, and the stated registration assumptions.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-security"]},{"id":"paper-3-claim-disruption","kind":"claim","parent_id":"paper-3-claims","order":2,"epistemic_status":"simulation_supported","title":"Lower disruption than reassociation","summary":"The NC-TUns comparison reports that PEUC-WiN retains TCP connections across address changes and therefore avoids the repeated handshakes, slow starts, and longer outages of reassociation-based rotation.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-performance","anchor-paper-3-results"]},{"id":"paper-3-evidence","kind":"evidence_group","parent_id":"paper-3","order":6,"epistemic_status":"simulation_and_measurement","title":"Evidence","summary":"The authors measured interface-switch time on Linux laptops and simulated five cooperative users, two correspondent-path delay regimes, and comparative TCP throughput in NC-TUns 3.0.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-performance","anchor-paper-3-results"]},{"id":"paper-3-boundaries","kind":"limitation_group","parent_id":"paper-3","order":7,"epistemic_status":"material","title":"Trusted boundary and limitations","summary":"The design depends on a trusted, available proxy and group secrets, excludes physical-layer tracking, and was simulated because commodity Wi-Fi drivers did not expose sequence-number control needed for implementation.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-security","anchor-paper-3-performance"]},{"id":"paper-3-boundary-compromise","kind":"limitation","parent_id":"paper-3-boundaries","order":1,"epistemic_status":"explicitly_vulnerable","title":"Member compromise and former-member leakage","summary":"A malicious member that joins or is compromised learns the address schedule and can track members; forward-secure group-key refresh is suggested but left out of scope.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-security"]},{"id":"paper-3-boundary-traffic","kind":"limitation","parent_id":"paper-3-boundaries","order":2,"epistemic_status":"unresolved","title":"Traffic analysis and proxy bottleneck","summary":"The proxy address can reveal group affiliation, triangular routing can degrade throughput, and the proxy is a bottleneck and single point of failure unless replicated.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-security","anchor-paper-3-performance"]},{"id":"paper-3-artifacts","kind":"artifact","parent_id":"paper-3","order":8,"epistemic_status":"paper_available_no_code","title":"Artifacts","summary":"A fixed local copy of the archived author manuscript is available; no simulator configuration, code, packet traces, or implementation artifact was located.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-archive","anchor-paper-3-performance"]},{"id":"paper-3-scrutiny","kind":"scrutiny","parent_id":"paper-3","order":9,"epistemic_status":"peer_reviewed","title":"Scrutiny and lineage","summary":"The protocol appeared at NPSec 2006 and contrasts its transport continuity with earlier disposable-identifier and silent-period proposals; no independent reproduction or later adversarial analysis was located.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-problem","anchor-paper-3-publication"]}],"relations":[{"id":"paper-3-relation-control-component","type":"component_of","from_id":"paper-3-protocol-control","to_id":"paper-3-protocol"},{"id":"paper-3-relation-rotation-component","type":"component_of","from_id":"paper-3-protocol-rotation","to_id":"paper-3-protocol"},{"id":"paper-3-relation-proxy-component","type":"component_of","from_id":"paper-3-protocol-proxy","to_id":"paper-3-protocol"},{"id":"paper-3-relation-protocol-realizes-answer","type":"realizes","from_id":"paper-3-protocol","to_id":"paper-3-answer"},{"id":"paper-3-relation-evidence-supports-disruption","type":"supports","from_id":"paper-3-evidence","to_id":"paper-3-claim-disruption"},{"id":"paper-3-relation-anonymity-qualifies-privacy","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-3-scope-anonymity","to_id":"paper-3-claim-privacy"},{"id":"paper-3-relation-compromise-qualifies-privacy","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-3-boundary-compromise","to_id":"paper-3-claim-privacy"},{"id":"paper-3-relation-traffic-qualifies-answer","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-3-boundary-traffic","to_id":"paper-3-answer"}],"assessment":{"id":"paper-3-assessment-2026-07-11","rubric_version":"0.2","assessed_at":"2026-07-11","status":"ai_draft_author_review_pending","note":"These dimensions describe documented support and process, not truth, correctness, or a universal ranking. No composite score is calculated.","axes":[{"id":"epistemic_evidence","level":"medium","rationale":"The paper specifies the protocol and threat boundaries and supplies comparative simulation plus limited timing measurements, but lacks a formal proof, working implementation, public traces, and independent reproduction.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-protocol","anchor-paper-3-security","anchor-paper-3-performance","anchor-paper-3-results"]},{"id":"auditability","level":"high","rationale":"A fixed, author-origin full text is checked in with page count and hash, making the claims and stated evidence directly inspectable; no executable artifact is available.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-archive","anchor-paper-3-results"]},{"id":"production_provenance","level":"medium","rationale":"Named authorship, manuscript provenance, and official publication metadata are documented; roles, revision/effort history, tool use, and simulation-artifact lineage are not.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-archive","anchor-paper-3-publication"]},{"id":"external_scrutiny","level":"medium","rationale":"The work has an official workshop publication record; review reports, reproduction, corrections, and independent security analysis were not located.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-publication"]},{"id":"reception","level":"low","rationale":"A dated exact-title scholarly-web search did not yield a transparent verified citation count in this environment. Under the author's rule, zero located citations maps to low; this is not a claim that the paper has no citations.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-citation-search"]},{"id":"contribution_significance","level":"medium","rationale":"The protocol makes a concrete privacy/performance tradeoff and anticipates practical transport-state continuity, but its trusted proxy and unimplemented driver requirements constrain the supported reach.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-3-problem","anchor-paper-3-protocol","anchor-paper-3-performance"]}]},"reception_snapshot":{"as_of":"2026-07-11","method":"Exact-title scholarly-web search; transparent index count unavailable","source":"Google Scholar query route plus general scholarly-web search","citation_count":0,"signals":[],"limitation":"Zero means no citations were verifiably located during this constrained search, not a total bibliometric count; author should replace it with a confirmed index snapshot."}}