{"schema_version":"0.1","map_id":"paper-63-map","publication_id":63,"publication_anchor":"paper-63","slug":"paper-63","canonical_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-63/","machine_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-63.json","root_node_id":"paper-63","stage":"mapped_draft","contribution_type_vocabulary_version":"0.1","contribution_types":[],"title":"How Byzantine Is a Send Corruption?","year":2022,"venue":"20th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS)","publication_status":"Published","topic":"algorithms-foundations","labels":["Theory"],"authors":["Karim Eldefrawy","Julian Loss","Ben Terner"],"keywords":["Byzantine agreement","consensus","send corruption","receive corruption","strongly adaptive adversary","expected constant rounds"],"research_question":"In synchronous consensus with Byzantine, receive, and honest-but-faulty send corruptions, what fault thresholds are achievable in expected constant rounds, and how much weaker than Byzantine control is the ability to suppress an honest party's outgoing messages?","central_answer":"The paper constructs expected-constant-round consensus from all-to-all repair, weak broadcast, weak consensus, graded consensus, and a common coin. It proves security for n greater than t_rcv + 2t_snd + 2t_byz under general send corruption, and for n greater than t_rcv + t_snd + 2t_byz under spotty all-or-none per-round send corruption; the latter threshold is proved optimal, while optimality in the general case remains open.","curation":{"drafted_at":"2026-07-11","drafted_by":[{"actor_type":"ai","name":"OpenAI Codex","role":"full-text theorem extraction, model mapping, and initial assessment"}],"method":"Source-grounded review of the complete 33-page IACR ePrint and the official and CISPA publication records. The map separates the general-send theorem from the stronger spotty-send theorem and its matching impossibility result.","source_scope":"full_source_audit","approval":{"status":"pending","note":"AI-authored source map awaiting author verification. Fault-model terminology, threshold notation, and the scope of the optimality theorem should be checked before approval."}},"sources":[{"id":"source-paper-63-eprint","type":"public_archive_copy","title":"How Byzantine Is a Send Corruption?","url":"https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/796.pdf","provenance_category":"archive","media_type":"application/pdf","page_count":33,"version_note":"IACR ePrint full version used for the technical audit."},{"id":"source-paper-63-official","type":"official_publication_record","title":"Springer ACNS 2022 chapter record","url":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_34","provenance_category":"official"},{"id":"source-paper-63-author","type":"author_affiliation_record","title":"CISPA publication page","url":"https://cispa.de/en/research/publications/66354-how-byzantine-is-a-send-corruption-","provenance_category":"author"},{"id":"source-paper-63-openalex","type":"citation_index_snapshot","title":"OpenAlex record W3186077535","url":"https://api.openalex.org/works/W3186077535","accessed_at":"2026-07-11"}],"source_anchors":[{"id":"anchor-paper-63-results","source_id":"source-paper-63-eprint","label":"Research question, thresholds, pathology, and open general-case optimality","locator":"Abstract and Sections 1.1-1.5, PDF pages 1-7","url":"https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/796.pdf#page=1"},{"id":"anchor-paper-63-model","source_id":"source-paper-63-eprint","label":"Synchronous network, corruption modes, strong rushing, PKI, and common coin","locator":"Sections 2.1-2.2, PDF pages 7-10","url":"https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/796.pdf#page=7"},{"id":"anchor-paper-63-pathology","source_id":"source-paper-63-eprint","label":"Dolev-Strong lower bound, degradation, and failure of recent techniques","locator":"Section 3, PDF pages 11-14","url":"https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/796.pdf#page=11"},{"id":"anchor-paper-63-fixreceive","source_id":"source-paper-63-eprint","label":"Two-round all-to-all FixReceive and zombie detection","locator":"Section 4.1 and Protocol 2, PDF pages 14-15","url":"https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/796.pdf#page=14"},{"id":"anchor-paper-63-building-blocks","source_id":"source-paper-63-eprint","label":"Weak broadcast, weak consensus, and graded consensus","locator":"Sections 4.2-4.4 and Protocols 3-5, PDF pages 15-21","url":"https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/796.pdf#page=15"},{"id":"anchor-paper-63-main-theorem","source_id":"source-paper-63-eprint","label":"Expected-constant-round protocol and general-send security theorem","locator":"Section 4.5, Theorem 3, Protocol 6, and Lemmas 7-11, PDF pages 22-26","url":"https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/796.pdf#page=22"},{"id":"anchor-paper-63-spotty","source_id":"source-paper-63-eprint","label":"Improved spotty-send threshold and matching impossibility","locator":"Section 5, Theorems 4-5, PDF pages 26-28","url":"https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/796.pdf#page=26"},{"id":"anchor-paper-63-publication","source_id":"source-paper-63-official","label":"Official peer-reviewed publication record","locator":"ACNS 2022, DOI 10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_34","url":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_34"},{"id":"anchor-paper-63-author-summary","source_id":"source-paper-63-author","label":"Author-affiliation summary and publication identity","locator":"CISPA publication page, accessed 2026-07-11","url":"https://cispa.de/en/research/publications/66354-how-byzantine-is-a-send-corruption-"},{"id":"anchor-paper-63-citations","source_id":"source-paper-63-openalex","label":"Dated citation-count snapshot","locator":"OpenAlex cited_by_count = 5, queried by DOI on 2026-07-11","url":"https://api.openalex.org/works/W3186077535"}],"nodes":[{"id":"paper-63","kind":"paper","parent_id":null,"order":1,"epistemic_status":"published","title":"How Byzantine is send corruption?","summary":"A theory of synchronous consensus under mixed Byzantine, send, and receive corruptions, with expected-constant-round constructions and a tight result for the spotty-send submodel.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-results"]},{"id":"paper-63-question","kind":"question","parent_id":"paper-63","order":1,"epistemic_status":"research_question","title":"Research question","summary":"How do achievable consensus thresholds change when faulty parties follow the protocol but an adaptive adversary suppresses messages they send or receive?","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-results"]},{"id":"paper-63-answer","kind":"contribution","parent_id":"paper-63","order":2,"epistemic_status":"proved_conditional","title":"Central answer","summary":"General send faults incur a coefficient of two in the proved threshold; restricting each corrupted sender's round to uniform delivery or uniform dropping removes that extra coefficient and yields a matching lower bound.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-main-theorem","anchor-paper-63-spotty"]},{"id":"paper-63-model-node","kind":"threat_model","parent_id":"paper-63","order":3,"epistemic_status":"defined","title":"Synchronous mixed-corruption model","summary":"Parties communicate over authenticated point-to-point channels with known delay bound; a strongly rushing adaptive adversary may select Byzantine, receive-corrupt, and send-corrupt parties, with overlap counted in each applicable budget.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-model"]},{"id":"paper-63-model-live","kind":"definition","parent_id":"paper-63-model-node","order":1,"epistemic_status":"defined","title":"Live parties and zombies","summary":"Honest, send-corrupt, and undetected receive-corrupt parties are live and must produce consistent outputs; a receive-corrupt party that detects missing traffic becomes a zombie, stops participating, and outputs failure.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-model","anchor-paper-63-fixreceive"]},{"id":"paper-63-model-spotty","kind":"definition","parent_id":"paper-63-model-node","order":2,"epistemic_status":"defined","title":"General versus spotty send corruption","summary":"General send corruption permits recipient-selective suppression, whereas spotty corruption requires all of a sender's still-undelivered messages in a round to be delivered or dropped together.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-model"]},{"id":"paper-63-pathology-node","kind":"analysis","parent_id":"paper-63","order":4,"epistemic_status":"proved_and_demonstrated","title":"Why send faults are unexpectedly strong","summary":"Selective delivery can give honest and send-corrupt groups incompatible views while both groups' outputs remain constrained; threshold signatures, leader-election techniques, and time-lock-puzzle broadcast do not automatically repair this asymmetry.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-pathology"]},{"id":"paper-63-construction","kind":"method","parent_id":"paper-63","order":5,"epistemic_status":"formally_specified","title":"Consensus construction","summary":"The construction composes all-to-all FixReceive, weak broadcast, weak consensus, graded consensus, a common coin, and signed decision certificates in a repeated coin-loop.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-fixreceive","anchor-paper-63-building-blocks","anchor-paper-63-main-theorem"]},{"id":"paper-63-construction-repair","kind":"component","parent_id":"paper-63-construction","order":1,"epistemic_status":"specified_and_proved","title":"All-to-all FixReceive","summary":"Parties send signed inputs, relay unique first-round messages, and become zombies if too few messages arrive; the proofs ensure a non-zombie party receives honest-origin traffic and propagates honest messages across live views.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-fixreceive"]},{"id":"paper-63-construction-graded","kind":"component","parent_id":"paper-63-construction","order":2,"epistemic_status":"specified_and_proved","title":"Graded-consensus bridge","summary":"Weak-consensus outputs are weak-broadcast in parallel; a party chooses the majority bit and assigns grade one only after a large enough support threshold rules out a conflicting live grade-one output.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-building-blocks"]},{"id":"paper-63-construction-coin","kind":"component","parent_id":"paper-63-construction","order":3,"epistemic_status":"assumes_primitive","title":"Common-coin loop and certificates","summary":"Each iteration combines graded consensus with a common coin; signed decision certificates propagate termination while preserving a single decision value.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-main-theorem"]},{"id":"paper-63-claims","kind":"claim_group","parent_id":"paper-63","order":6,"epistemic_status":"proved_conditional","title":"Main results","summary":"The full version proves validity, consistency, and expected termination under explicit threshold, synchrony, PKI/signature, and common-coin assumptions.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-main-theorem","anchor-paper-63-spotty"]},{"id":"paper-63-claim-general","kind":"theorem","parent_id":"paper-63-claims","order":1,"epistemic_status":"proved_conditional","title":"General-send threshold","summary":"Theorem 3 proves expected-constant-round consensus when n is greater than t_rcv + 2t_snd + 2t_byz, assuming the specified common coin is available.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-main-theorem"]},{"id":"paper-63-claim-spotty","kind":"theorem","parent_id":"paper-63-claims","order":2,"epistemic_status":"proved_tight","title":"Optimal spotty-send threshold","summary":"Theorems 4 and 5 establish sufficiency above, and impossibility at or below, n = t_rcv + t_snd + 2t_byz in the spotty-send model with zombies.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-spotty"]},{"id":"paper-63-claim-lowerbound","kind":"theorem","parent_id":"paper-63-claims","order":3,"epistemic_status":"inherited_and_reproved","title":"Deterministic-round lower bound","summary":"The Dolev-Strong neighboring-execution argument transfers to send corruptions, so deterministic authenticated broadcast tolerating t_snd send faults cannot finish in fewer than t_snd + 1 rounds.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-pathology"]},{"id":"paper-63-evidence","kind":"evidence_group","parent_id":"paper-63","order":7,"epistemic_status":"formal_paper_proofs","title":"Evidence and proof chain","summary":"Protocol pseudocode, definitions, quorum arguments, reductions among consensus primitives, termination bounds, and a partition-style impossibility proof support the results; no machine-checked proof or implementation artifact is claimed.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-building-blocks","anchor-paper-63-main-theorem","anchor-paper-63-spotty"]},{"id":"paper-63-boundaries","kind":"limitation_group","parent_id":"paper-63","order":8,"epistemic_status":"material","title":"Limits and open questions","summary":"The model is synchronous and uses authenticated channels, a PKI, signatures, and a common coin; optimal combined send/Byzantine tolerance for recipient-selective general send corruption remains unresolved.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-results","anchor-paper-63-model","anchor-paper-63-pathology"]},{"id":"paper-63-resources","kind":"artifact_group","parent_id":"paper-63","order":9,"epistemic_status":"source_available","title":"Auditable resources","summary":"A complete public ePrint supplies definitions, protocols, and proofs, while the Springer DOI and CISPA page establish publication identity; no executable artifact is represented.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-results","anchor-paper-63-publication","anchor-paper-63-author-summary"]},{"id":"paper-63-scrutiny","kind":"scrutiny","parent_id":"paper-63","order":10,"epistemic_status":"venue_reviewed","title":"External scrutiny","summary":"The work appeared at ACNS 2022 and has a public full version. This audit did not locate public reviews, a machine-checked proof audit, a correction, or an independent reproduction.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-publication","anchor-paper-63-citations"]},{"id":"paper-63-lineage","kind":"lineage","parent_id":"paper-63","order":11,"epistemic_status":"documented","title":"Research lineage","summary":"The paper extends mixed crash/send/receive/Byzantine models, diagnoses why dishonest-majority broadcast techniques do not transfer directly, and reframes send corruption through the gap between general and spotty delivery.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-results","anchor-paper-63-pathology"]}],"relations":[{"id":"paper-63-relation-question-answer","type":"answered_by","from_id":"paper-63-question","to_id":"paper-63-answer"},{"id":"paper-63-relation-model-claims","type":"scopes","from_id":"paper-63-model-node","to_id":"paper-63-claims"},{"id":"paper-63-relation-pathology-construction","type":"motivates","from_id":"paper-63-pathology-node","to_id":"paper-63-construction"},{"id":"paper-63-relation-repair-construction","type":"component_of","from_id":"paper-63-construction-repair","to_id":"paper-63-construction"},{"id":"paper-63-relation-construction-general","type":"realizes","from_id":"paper-63-construction","to_id":"paper-63-claim-general"},{"id":"paper-63-relation-spotty-answer","type":"supports","from_id":"paper-63-claim-spotty","to_id":"paper-63-answer"},{"id":"paper-63-relation-evidence-claims","type":"supports","from_id":"paper-63-evidence","to_id":"paper-63-claims"},{"id":"paper-63-relation-boundaries-claims","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-63-boundaries","to_id":"paper-63-claims"},{"id":"paper-63-relation-resources-evidence","type":"enables_audit_of","from_id":"paper-63-resources","to_id":"paper-63-evidence"}],"assessment":{"id":"paper-63-assessment-2026-07-11","rubric_version":"0.2","assessed_at":"2026-07-11","status":"ai_draft_author_review_pending","note":"These dimensions describe documented support and process, not truth, correctness, or a universal ranking. No composite score is calculated.","axes":[{"id":"epistemic_evidence","level":"high","rationale":"The full version defines the model, specifies all subprotocols, proves the general and spotty thresholds, and supplies a matching spotty impossibility; the general threshold remains non-optimal and the proofs are not machine checked.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-model","anchor-paper-63-main-theorem","anchor-paper-63-spotty"]},{"id":"auditability","level":"high","rationale":"A complete public IACR full text exposes the definitions, protocol pseudocode, theorem statements, and proofs, with official and author-affiliation metadata linked separately.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-results","anchor-paper-63-main-theorem","anchor-paper-63-publication"]},{"id":"production_provenance","level":"medium","rationale":"Named authorship, ePrint identity, and peer-reviewed publication establish baseline provenance; roles, revision decisions, proof review, tool/AI use, and author approval of this map are not fully documented.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-results","anchor-paper-63-publication"]},{"id":"external_scrutiny","level":"medium","rationale":"ACNS publication and public availability provide external exposure, but no public review reports, independent proof audit, formal mechanization, or correction history was located.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-publication","anchor-paper-63-author-summary"]},{"id":"reception","level":"low","rationale":"OpenAlex record W3186077535 reported 5 citations in a DOI-specific query on 2026-07-11; this lies in the rubric's 0-8 range and remains a time-dependent, coverage-limited snapshot.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-citations"]},{"id":"contribution_significance","level":"high","rationale":"The paper supplies the first claimed sublinear-round consensus result allowing a majority of online faulty parties in the spotty model, proves that threshold optimal, and identifies a structural obstruction for general send faults.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-63-results","anchor-paper-63-spotty"]}]},"reception_snapshot":{"as_of":"2026-07-11","method":"OpenAlex work lookup filtered by DOI 10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_34","citation_count":5,"signals":[{"type":"citation_count","value":5,"source_url":"https://api.openalex.org/works/W3186077535"}],"limitation":"OpenAlex coverage, deduplication, and citation linkage are incomplete and can change; the count is a dated observation rather than a quality judgment."}}