{"schema_version":"0.1","map_id":"paper-7-map","publication_id":7,"publication_anchor":"paper-7","slug":"paper-7","canonical_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-7/","machine_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-7.json","root_node_id":"paper-7","stage":"mapped_draft","contribution_type_vocabulary_version":"0.1","contribution_types":["protocol"],"title":"ALARM: Anonymous Location-Aided Routing in Suspicious MANETs","year":2007,"venue":"IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP)","topic":"privacy-identity","labels":["Theory","Applied"],"authors":["Karim Eldefrawy","Gene Tsudik"],"keywords":["anonymous routing","location privacy","group signatures"],"research_question":"Can a link-state mobile ad hoc routing protocol authenticate topology information and deliver to geographic destinations without exposing stable node identities or readily linkable location histories?","central_answer":"ALARM has every member periodically flood a group-signed location announcement containing a timestamp, temporary public key, and one-time pseudonym. Nodes construct a location topology and route to locations rather than long-term identities. The paper informally analyzes passive-insider and active-outsider security and simulates privacy under several mobility models.","curation":{"drafted_at":"2026-07-11","drafted_by":[{"actor_type":"ai","name":"OpenAI Codex","role":"full-text extraction, evidence linking, and initial assessment"}],"method":"Full-source audit of the checked-in UCI author copy and official IEEE DOI record.","source_scope":"full_source_audit","approval":{"status":"pending","note":"AI-drafted, source-linked map awaiting author verification before approval."}},"sources":[{"id":"source-paper-7-paper","type":"author_copy","title":"ALARM: Anonymous Location-Aided Routing in Suspicious MANETs","url":"/pubs/2007/alarm-icnp2007.pdf","media_type":"application/pdf","sha256":"8413fcbe7caba7e218d60019e7a7e4ae4ad5ca28a1c695cbf5fdb5abbc613e14","page_count":10,"provenance_category":"author","version_note":"UCI author-hosted conference paper; local copy checked 2026-07-11."},{"id":"source-paper-7-author","type":"author_copy_origin","title":"UCI author copy","url":"https://ics.uci.edu/~gts/paps/alarm07.pdf"},{"id":"source-paper-7-official","type":"official_publication_record","title":"IEEE DOI record","url":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNP.2007.4375861"},{"id":"source-paper-7-citations","type":"citation_search","title":"Dated scholarly-web citation search","url":"https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22ALARM%3A+Anonymous+Location-Aided+Routing+in+Suspicious+MANETs%22","version_note":"Search attempted 2026-07-11; no transparent citation count was retrievable in this environment."}],"source_anchors":[{"id":"anchor-paper-7-problem","source_id":"source-paper-7-paper","label":"Goals, contributions, and routing choice","locator":"Abstract and Sections I-II, PDF pages 1-3","url":"/pubs/2007/alarm-icnp2007.pdf#page=1"},{"id":"anchor-paper-7-assumptions","source_id":"source-paper-7-paper","label":"System assumptions and group-signature interface","locator":"Section IV, PDF pages 4-5","url":"/pubs/2007/alarm-icnp2007.pdf#page=4"},{"id":"anchor-paper-7-protocol","source_id":"source-paper-7-paper","label":"LAM generation, flooding, pseudonyms, and delivery","locator":"Section IV, PDF pages 5-6","url":"/pubs/2007/alarm-icnp2007.pdf#page=5"},{"id":"anchor-paper-7-security","source_id":"source-paper-7-paper","label":"Threat model and informal security analysis","locator":"Section V, PDF pages 6-7","url":"/pubs/2007/alarm-icnp2007.pdf#page=6"},{"id":"anchor-paper-7-metric","source_id":"source-paper-7-paper","label":"Average Node Privacy definition","locator":"Section VI, PDF pages 7-8","url":"/pubs/2007/alarm-icnp2007.pdf#page=7"},{"id":"anchor-paper-7-results","source_id":"source-paper-7-paper","label":"Mobility-model simulation results","locator":"Section VI and Figures 3-6, PDF pages 7-9","url":"/pubs/2007/alarm-icnp2007.pdf#page=7"},{"id":"anchor-paper-7-discussion","source_id":"source-paper-7-paper","label":"Overhead, insider protection, and deployment boundaries","locator":"Section VII, PDF pages 9-10","url":"/pubs/2007/alarm-icnp2007.pdf#page=9"},{"id":"anchor-paper-7-provenance","source_id":"source-paper-7-author","label":"Author-copy provenance","locator":"Public UCI author-hosted PDF","url":"https://ics.uci.edu/~gts/paps/alarm07.pdf"},{"id":"anchor-paper-7-publication","source_id":"source-paper-7-official","label":"Official publication metadata","locator":"DOI 10.1109/ICNP.2007.4375861","url":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNP.2007.4375861"},{"id":"anchor-paper-7-citation-search","source_id":"source-paper-7-citations","label":"Citation search attempted","locator":"Exact-title search, 2026-07-11; no verified count retrieved","url":"https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22ALARM%3A+Anonymous+Location-Aided+Routing+in+Suspicious+MANETs%22"}],"nodes":[{"id":"paper-7","kind":"paper","parent_id":null,"order":1,"epistemic_status":"published","title":"ALARM","summary":"A location-aided link-state routing protocol that combines group signatures, rotating pseudonyms, and temporary encryption keys to reduce identity and movement disclosure.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-problem","anchor-paper-7-publication"]},{"id":"paper-7-question","kind":"question","parent_id":"paper-7","order":1,"epistemic_status":"research_question","title":"Research question","summary":"Can nodes authenticate a mobile topology and route by location while remaining anonymous and difficult to track?","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-problem"]},{"id":"paper-7-answer","kind":"contribution","parent_id":"paper-7","order":2,"epistemic_status":"proposed_and_simulated","title":"Central answer","summary":"Authenticate unlinkable per-slot location announcements with group signatures, derive a common topology snapshot, and address encrypted traffic to a location-bound temporary key and pseudonym.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-protocol","anchor-paper-7-results"]},{"id":"paper-7-scope","kind":"scope","parent_id":"paper-7","order":3,"epistemic_status":"explicitly_scoped","title":"Environment and trust assumptions","summary":"Nodes know location and time, share a bounded radio range, move enough to create ambiguity, and obtain group credentials from an offline group manager; the analysis assumes a passive insider or active outsider.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-assumptions","anchor-paper-7-security"]},{"id":"paper-7-protocol","kind":"protocol","parent_id":"paper-7","order":4,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"Location Announcement Message protocol","summary":"Each slot, a node floods its location, timestamp, temporary public key, and group signature. Recipients verify and deduplicate LAMs, build a geographic connectivity graph, and use the signature as a one-slot pseudonym.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-protocol"]},{"id":"paper-7-routing","kind":"component","parent_id":"paper-7-protocol","order":1,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"Location-addressed delivery","summary":"A sender selects the current pseudonym at the destination location and encrypts under that LAM's temporary key, avoiding a stable identity in route establishment.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-protocol"]},{"id":"paper-7-security","kind":"claim_group","parent_id":"paper-7","order":5,"epistemic_status":"informally_argued","title":"Security and privacy claims","summary":"Group-signature verification authenticates membership without naming the signer; timestamps resist replay, while randomized movement and fresh signatures are intended to frustrate linking across topology snapshots.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-security"]},{"id":"paper-7-insider","kind":"limitation","parent_id":"paper-7-security","order":1,"epistemic_status":"conditional","title":"Active-insider boundary","summary":"Ordinary group signatures do not stop a malicious member from multiple-location Sybil announcements; self-distinguishing signatures or tamper-resistant location/signing hardware is required for that stronger threat.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-protocol","anchor-paper-7-discussion"]},{"id":"paper-7-metric","kind":"metric","parent_id":"paper-7","order":6,"epistemic_status":"defined","title":"Average Node Privacy","summary":"ANP measures, across two topology snapshots, the average fraction of later nodes to which an earlier node can remain plausibly mapped; it ranges from complete traceability to full ambiguity.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-metric"]},{"id":"paper-7-evidence","kind":"evidence_group","parent_id":"paper-7","order":7,"epistemic_status":"simulation","title":"Mobility simulations","summary":"Random-walk, random-waypoint, and reference-point group mobility experiments vary speed and evaluate ANP; privacy deteriorates when motion is slow, predictable, or preserves relative group positions.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-results"]},{"id":"paper-7-boundaries","kind":"limitation_group","parent_id":"paper-7","order":8,"epistemic_status":"material","title":"Protocol boundaries","summary":"Jamming and DoS, physical observation, and strongly correlated movement are outside the claimed protection. Periodic network-wide LAM flooding costs bandwidth and power and reveals topology and network size.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-security","anchor-paper-7-results","anchor-paper-7-discussion"]},{"id":"paper-7-artifacts","kind":"artifact","parent_id":"paper-7","order":9,"epistemic_status":"paper_available_no_code","title":"Artifacts","summary":"A fixed author copy is available locally; protocol code, group-signature integration, simulator configuration, and result data were not located.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-results","anchor-paper-7-provenance"]},{"id":"paper-7-scrutiny","kind":"scrutiny","parent_id":"paper-7","order":10,"epistemic_status":"peer_reviewed","title":"Scrutiny","summary":"ALARM appeared at IEEE ICNP 2007. The paper provides an informal analysis and simulations, but no formal security proof or independent reproduction was located.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-security","anchor-paper-7-publication"]}],"relations":[{"id":"paper-7-relation-protocol-realizes-answer","type":"realizes","from_id":"paper-7-protocol","to_id":"paper-7-answer"},{"id":"paper-7-relation-routing-component","type":"component_of","from_id":"paper-7-routing","to_id":"paper-7-protocol"},{"id":"paper-7-relation-security-supports-answer","type":"supports","from_id":"paper-7-security","to_id":"paper-7-answer"},{"id":"paper-7-relation-metric-evaluates-answer","type":"evaluates","from_id":"paper-7-metric","to_id":"paper-7-answer"},{"id":"paper-7-relation-evidence-supports-answer","type":"supports","from_id":"paper-7-evidence","to_id":"paper-7-answer"},{"id":"paper-7-relation-insider-qualifies-security","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-7-insider","to_id":"paper-7-security"},{"id":"paper-7-relation-boundaries-qualify-answer","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-7-boundaries","to_id":"paper-7-answer"}],"assessment":{"id":"paper-7-assessment-2026-07-11","rubric_version":"0.2","assessed_at":"2026-07-11","status":"ai_draft_author_review_pending","note":"These dimensions describe documented support and process, not truth, correctness, or a universal ranking. No composite score is calculated.","axes":[{"id":"epistemic_evidence","level":"medium","rationale":"The protocol, threat boundaries, informal analysis, privacy metric, and mobility simulations are documented, but no formal proof, implementation, or independent reproduction is supplied.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-protocol","anchor-paper-7-security","anchor-paper-7-metric","anchor-paper-7-results"]},{"id":"auditability","level":"high","rationale":"A fixed author-hosted full text is checked in with page count and hash, making the protocol and evidence directly inspectable.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-provenance","anchor-paper-7-results"]},{"id":"production_provenance","level":"medium","rationale":"Named authorship, author-copy provenance, and official metadata are documented; roles, revisions, tool use, and simulation lineage are not.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-provenance","anchor-paper-7-publication"]},{"id":"external_scrutiny","level":"medium","rationale":"The work has an official full-conference publication record; public reviews, formal verification, and independent reproduction were not located.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-publication"]},{"id":"reception","level":"low","rationale":"No citations were verifiably located in the constrained dated search. Under the author's 0-8 rule this is low, but it is not a claim that the paper has no citations.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-citation-search"]},{"id":"contribution_significance","level":"high","rationale":"ALARM combines a concrete routing protocol, anonymity mechanism, insider/outsider analysis, and an explicit privacy metric, while making its mobility and insider assumptions visible.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-7-problem","anchor-paper-7-protocol","anchor-paper-7-metric","anchor-paper-7-discussion"]}]},"reception_snapshot":{"as_of":"2026-07-11","method":"Exact-title scholarly-web search; transparent index count unavailable","source":"Google Scholar query route plus general scholarly-web search","citation_count":0,"signals":[],"limitation":"Zero means no citations were verifiably located during this constrained search, not a total bibliometric count; author should replace it with a confirmed index snapshot."}}