{"schema_version":"0.1","map_id":"paper-9-map","publication_id":9,"publication_anchor":"paper-9","slug":"paper-9","canonical_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-9/","machine_path":"/knowledge/papers/paper-9.json","root_node_id":"paper-9","stage":"mapped_draft","contribution_type_vocabulary_version":"0.1","contribution_types":["protocol"],"title":"PRISM: Privacy-Friendly Routing in Suspicious MANETs (and VANETs)","year":2008,"venue":"IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP)","topic":"privacy-identity","labels":["Theory","Applied"],"authors":["Karim Eldefrawy","Gene Tsudik"],"keywords":["anonymous routing","location privacy","MANETs"],"research_question":"Can reactive routing in a suspicious MANET avoid persistent identities and global topology disclosure while still authenticating communicating nodes and supporting later accountability?","central_answer":"PRISM makes communication location-centric and adapts AODV: a group-signed route request names a destination area and temporary key; a responding node returns its exact location and a session key encrypted to the source. Hash-linked route state hides persistent identifiers, and an offline group manager can open logged signatures after misbehavior. Simulations compare routing overhead and topology exposure with ALARM.","curation":{"drafted_at":"2026-07-11","drafted_by":[{"actor_type":"ai","name":"OpenAI Codex","role":"full-text extraction, evidence linking, and initial assessment"}],"method":"Full-source audit of the checked-in UCI author copy and official IEEE DOI record.","source_scope":"full_source_audit","approval":{"status":"pending","note":"AI-drafted, source-linked map awaiting author verification before approval."}},"sources":[{"id":"source-paper-9-paper","type":"author_copy","title":"PRISM: Privacy-Friendly Routing in Suspicious MANETs (and VANETs)","url":"/pubs/2008/prism-icnp2008.pdf","media_type":"application/pdf","sha256":"76f3a07a26f332f2023818d47973351c7877f55d134b9863e6ca11617f831146","page_count":10,"provenance_category":"author","version_note":"UCI author-hosted conference paper; local copy checked 2026-07-11."},{"id":"source-paper-9-author","type":"author_copy_origin","title":"UCI author copy","url":"https://sprout.ics.uci.edu/pubs/04697044.pdf"},{"id":"source-paper-9-official","type":"official_publication_record","title":"IEEE DOI record","url":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNP.2008.4697044"},{"id":"source-paper-9-citations","type":"citation_search","title":"Dated scholarly-web citation search","url":"https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22PRISM%3A+Privacy-Friendly+Routing+in+Suspicious+MANETs%22","version_note":"Search attempted 2026-07-11; no transparent citation count was retrievable in this environment."}],"source_anchors":[{"id":"anchor-paper-9-problem","source_id":"source-paper-9-paper","label":"Problem, goals, and contributions","locator":"Abstract and Sections I-II, PDF pages 1-3","url":"/pubs/2008/prism-icnp2008.pdf#page=1"},{"id":"anchor-paper-9-environment","source_id":"source-paper-9-paper","label":"Environment, adversary, and trust assumptions","locator":"Section III, PDF pages 3-4","url":"/pubs/2008/prism-icnp2008.pdf#page=3"},{"id":"anchor-paper-9-protocol","source_id":"source-paper-9-paper","label":"RREQ/RREP protocol","locator":"Section IV-A-C, PDF pages 4-6","url":"/pubs/2008/prism-icnp2008.pdf#page=4"},{"id":"anchor-paper-9-security","source_id":"source-paper-9-paper","label":"Security analysis and active-insider boundary","locator":"Section IV-D, PDF pages 6-7","url":"/pubs/2008/prism-icnp2008.pdf#page=6"},{"id":"anchor-paper-9-forensics","source_id":"source-paper-9-paper","label":"Offline audit of excessive probing","locator":"Section IV-D, PDF page 7","url":"/pubs/2008/prism-icnp2008.pdf#page=7"},{"id":"anchor-paper-9-evaluation","source_id":"source-paper-9-paper","label":"Simulation design and overhead results","locator":"Section VI and Figures 1-3, PDF pages 8-9","url":"/pubs/2008/prism-icnp2008.pdf#page=8"},{"id":"anchor-paper-9-privacy","source_id":"source-paper-9-paper","label":"Topology-exposure results","locator":"Section VI.3 and Figure 4, PDF page 9","url":"/pubs/2008/prism-icnp2008.pdf#page=9"},{"id":"anchor-paper-9-conclusion","source_id":"source-paper-9-paper","label":"Conclusions and future work","locator":"Section VII, PDF page 9","url":"/pubs/2008/prism-icnp2008.pdf#page=9"},{"id":"anchor-paper-9-provenance","source_id":"source-paper-9-author","label":"Author-copy provenance","locator":"Public UCI author-hosted PDF","url":"https://sprout.ics.uci.edu/pubs/04697044.pdf"},{"id":"anchor-paper-9-publication","source_id":"source-paper-9-official","label":"Official publication metadata","locator":"DOI 10.1109/ICNP.2008.4697044","url":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNP.2008.4697044"},{"id":"anchor-paper-9-citation-search","source_id":"source-paper-9-citations","label":"Citation search attempted","locator":"Exact-title search, 2026-07-11; no verified count retrieved","url":"https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22PRISM%3A+Privacy-Friendly+Routing+in+Suspicious+MANETs%22"}],"nodes":[{"id":"paper-9","kind":"paper","parent_id":null,"order":1,"epistemic_status":"published","title":"PRISM","summary":"A privacy-oriented, location-centric reactive MANET routing protocol using group-signed requests and replies, temporary keys, and offline accountability.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-problem","anchor-paper-9-publication"]},{"id":"paper-9-question","kind":"question","parent_id":"paper-9","order":1,"epistemic_status":"research_question","title":"Research question","summary":"Can on-demand routing protect movement privacy without preshared source-destination secrets, online identity servers, or full topology advertisement?","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-problem"]},{"id":"paper-9-answer","kind":"contribution","parent_id":"paper-9","order":2,"epistemic_status":"proposed_and_simulated","title":"Central answer","summary":"Address a geographic area, authenticate only the source and responding destination with unlinkable group signatures, and keep intermediate state under hashes of one-time route messages.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-protocol","anchor-paper-9-evaluation","anchor-paper-9-privacy"]},{"id":"paper-9-scope","kind":"scope","parent_id":"paper-9","order":3,"epistemic_status":"explicitly_scoped","title":"Location-centric environment","summary":"Communication decisions are assumed to depend on current areas rather than persistent identities; nodes have GPS-like location, uniform range, public-key capability, and predeployment credentials from an offline TTP.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-environment"]},{"id":"paper-9-threat","kind":"threat_model","parent_id":"paper-9-scope","order":1,"epistemic_status":"explicitly_scoped","title":"Adversary model","summary":"Outsiders may be active or passive, but insiders in the primary privacy analysis are honest-but-curious. DoS, topology attacks, false location claims, and other active-insider behavior are excluded from the core guarantee.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-environment","anchor-paper-9-security"]},{"id":"paper-9-protocol","kind":"protocol","parent_id":"paper-9","order":4,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"PRISM route discovery","summary":"A RREQ contains a destination area, temporary public key, timestamp, and source group signature. A destination returns the RREQ hash, exact location, session key encrypted to the temporary key, and its group signature.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-protocol"]},{"id":"paper-9-route-state","kind":"component","parent_id":"paper-9-protocol","order":1,"epistemic_status":"specified","title":"Hash-linked route state","summary":"Intermediate nodes cache request and reply hashes and forward unchanged messages; the two hashes identify the established bidirectional route without exposing stable source or destination names.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-protocol"]},{"id":"paper-9-security","kind":"claim_group","parent_id":"paper-9","order":5,"epistemic_status":"informally_argued","title":"Privacy and authentication claims","summary":"Fresh group signatures and keys resist cross-route linkage, the MANET-wide key hides routing from outsiders, and source/destination logs let the TTP de-anonymize disputed messages later.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-security","anchor-paper-9-forensics"]},{"id":"paper-9-insider","kind":"limitation","parent_id":"paper-9-security","order":1,"epistemic_status":"explicitly_vulnerable","title":"Active-insider attacks","summary":"A member can lie about location, suppress or drop messages, create Sybil replies, or probe many areas. Some probing can be detected only after logs are submitted; real-time prevention is not provided.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-security","anchor-paper-9-forensics"]},{"id":"paper-9-evidence","kind":"evidence_group","parent_id":"paper-9","order":6,"epistemic_status":"simulation","title":"PRISM versus ALARM","summary":"Simulations use 100 nodes under random-waypoint and reference-point group mobility, varying the number of destination areas to compare routing messages and topology exposure.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-evaluation","anchor-paper-9-privacy"]},{"id":"paper-9-result","kind":"result","parent_id":"paper-9-evidence","order":1,"epistemic_status":"simulation_supported","title":"Workload-dependent efficiency and exposure","summary":"PRISM has lower total routing traffic than ALARM when each source contacts relatively few areas and exposes a smaller topology fraction; its advantage shrinks as destination probing grows, and discovery can take longer.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-evaluation","anchor-paper-9-privacy"]},{"id":"paper-9-boundaries","kind":"limitation_group","parent_id":"paper-9","order":7,"epistemic_status":"material","title":"Applicability limits","summary":"Empty destination areas cause timeout or expansion, destination interests are visible in RREQs, hop count is not verified, evaluation simplifies to at most one receiver per area, and no implementation or formal proof is supplied.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-environment","anchor-paper-9-protocol","anchor-paper-9-security","anchor-paper-9-conclusion"]},{"id":"paper-9-artifacts","kind":"artifact","parent_id":"paper-9","order":8,"epistemic_status":"paper_available_no_code","title":"Artifacts","summary":"A fixed author copy is available locally; protocol implementation, simulator code/configuration, and result data were not located.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-evaluation","anchor-paper-9-provenance"]},{"id":"paper-9-scrutiny","kind":"scrutiny","parent_id":"paper-9","order":9,"epistemic_status":"peer_reviewed","title":"Scrutiny","summary":"PRISM appeared at IEEE ICNP 2008 and explicitly compares itself with ALARM and other anonymous routing designs; independent reproduction was not located.","source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-evaluation","anchor-paper-9-publication"]}],"relations":[{"id":"paper-9-relation-threat-qualifies-scope","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-9-threat","to_id":"paper-9-scope"},{"id":"paper-9-relation-protocol-realizes-answer","type":"realizes","from_id":"paper-9-protocol","to_id":"paper-9-answer"},{"id":"paper-9-relation-route-component","type":"component_of","from_id":"paper-9-route-state","to_id":"paper-9-protocol"},{"id":"paper-9-relation-security-supports-answer","type":"supports","from_id":"paper-9-security","to_id":"paper-9-answer"},{"id":"paper-9-relation-insider-qualifies-security","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-9-insider","to_id":"paper-9-security"},{"id":"paper-9-relation-evidence-supports-answer","type":"supports","from_id":"paper-9-evidence","to_id":"paper-9-answer"},{"id":"paper-9-relation-boundaries-qualify-answer","type":"qualifies","from_id":"paper-9-boundaries","to_id":"paper-9-answer"}],"assessment":{"id":"paper-9-assessment-2026-07-11","rubric_version":"0.2","assessed_at":"2026-07-11","status":"ai_draft_author_review_pending","note":"These dimensions describe documented support and process, not truth, correctness, or a universal ranking. No composite score is calculated.","axes":[{"id":"epistemic_evidence","level":"medium","rationale":"The protocol and threat boundaries are detailed and overhead/topology exposure are simulated, but security is informal and no implementation, formal proof, or independent reproduction is supplied.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-protocol","anchor-paper-9-security","anchor-paper-9-evaluation","anchor-paper-9-privacy"]},{"id":"auditability","level":"high","rationale":"A fixed author-hosted full text is checked in with page count and hash, making protocol details, caveats, and simulation claims directly inspectable.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-provenance","anchor-paper-9-protocol","anchor-paper-9-privacy"]},{"id":"production_provenance","level":"medium","rationale":"Named authorship, author-copy provenance, and official metadata are documented; roles, revisions, tool use, and simulation lineage are not.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-provenance","anchor-paper-9-publication"]},{"id":"external_scrutiny","level":"medium","rationale":"The paper has an official full-conference publication record; review reports, formal verification, and independent reproduction were not located.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-publication"]},{"id":"reception","level":"low","rationale":"No citations were verifiably located in the constrained dated search. Under the author's 0-8 rule this is low, but it is not a claim that the paper has no citations.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-citation-search"]},{"id":"contribution_significance","level":"high","rationale":"PRISM articulates a location-centric alternative to identity-centric reactive routing, integrates privacy with accountability, and quantifies the topology/overhead tradeoff.","basis_source_anchor_ids":["anchor-paper-9-problem","anchor-paper-9-protocol","anchor-paper-9-privacy","anchor-paper-9-conclusion"]}]},"reception_snapshot":{"as_of":"2026-07-11","method":"Exact-title scholarly-web search; transparent index count unavailable","source":"Google Scholar query route plus general scholarly-web search","citation_count":0,"signals":[],"limitation":"Zero means no citations were verifiably located during this constrained search, not a total bibliometric count; author should replace it with a confirmed index snapshot."}}