Scientific knowledge map · Paper #63
How Byzantine Is a Send Corruption?
2022 · 20th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS)
- Theory
Research question
What does the paper try to establish?
In synchronous consensus with Byzantine, receive, and honest-but-faulty send corruptions, what fault thresholds are achievable in expected constant rounds, and how much weaker than Byzantine control is the ability to suppress an honest party's outgoing messages?
Central answer
What is the proposed answer?
The paper constructs expected-constant-round consensus from all-to-all repair, weak broadcast, weak consensus, graded consensus, and a common coin. It proves security for n greater than t_rcv + 2t_snd + 2t_byz under general send corruption, and for n greater than t_rcv + t_snd + 2t_byz under spotty all-or-none per-round send corruption; the latter threshold is proved optimal, while optimality in the general case remains open.
Evidence profile
Six dimensions, kept separate
The chart summarizes documented evidence and process. It is not a correctness probability, confidence score, or ranking, and no composite score is calculated.
LowMediumHighN/A = not assessed
A smaller value means less documented support for that dimension, not that the paper is false or unimportant.
- Epistemic evidence High
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The full version defines the model, specifies all subprotocols, proves the general and spotty thresholds, and supplies a matching spotty impossibility; the general threshold remains non-optimal and the proofs are not machine checked.
Synchronous network, corruption modes, strong rushing, PKI, and common coin Expected-constant-round protocol and general-send security theorem Improved spotty-send threshold and matching impossibility - Auditability High
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A complete public IACR full text exposes the definitions, protocol pseudocode, theorem statements, and proofs, with official and author-affiliation metadata linked separately.
Research question, thresholds, pathology, and open general-case optimality Expected-constant-round protocol and general-send security theorem Official peer-reviewed publication record - Production provenance Medium
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Named authorship, ePrint identity, and peer-reviewed publication establish baseline provenance; roles, revision decisions, proof review, tool/AI use, and author approval of this map are not fully documented.
Research question, thresholds, pathology, and open general-case optimality Official peer-reviewed publication record - External scrutiny Medium
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ACNS publication and public availability provide external exposure, but no public review reports, independent proof audit, formal mechanization, or correction history was located.
Official peer-reviewed publication record Author-affiliation summary and publication identity - Reception Low
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OpenAlex record W3186077535 reported 5 citations in a DOI-specific query on 2026-07-11; this lies in the rubric's 0-8 range and remains a time-dependent, coverage-limited snapshot.
Dated citation-count snapshot - Contribution significance High
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The paper supplies the first claimed sublinear-round consensus result allowing a majority of online faulty parties in the spotty model, proves that threshold optimal, and identifies a structural obstruction for general send faults.
Research question, thresholds, pathology, and open general-case optimality Improved spotty-send threshold and matching impossibility
Assessment: Ai draft author review pending · 2026-07-11 · rubric 0.2. These dimensions describe documented support and process, not truth, correctness, or a universal ranking. No composite score is calculated.
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Hierarchical knowledge map
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How Byzantine is send corruption?
A theory of synchronous consensus under mixed Byzantine, send, and receive corruptions, with expected-constant-round constructions and a tight result for the spotty-send submodel.
Research question, thresholds, pathology, and open general-case optimality-
question Research question
research questionHow do achievable consensus thresholds change when faulty parties follow the protocol but an adaptive adversary suppresses messages they send or receive?
Research question, thresholds, pathology, and open general-case optimality -
contribution Central answer
proved conditionalGeneral send faults incur a coefficient of two in the proved threshold; restricting each corrupted sender's round to uniform delivery or uniform dropping removes that extra coefficient and yields a matching lower bound.
Expected-constant-round protocol and general-send security theorem Improved spotty-send threshold and matching impossibility -
threat model Synchronous mixed-corruption model defined
Parties communicate over authenticated point-to-point channels with known delay bound; a strongly rushing adaptive adversary may select Byzantine, receive-corrupt, and send-corrupt parties, with overlap counted in each applicable budget.
Synchronous network, corruption modes, strong rushing, PKI, and common coin-
definition Live parties and zombies
definedHonest, send-corrupt, and undetected receive-corrupt parties are live and must produce consistent outputs; a receive-corrupt party that detects missing traffic becomes a zombie, stops participating, and outputs failure.
Synchronous network, corruption modes, strong rushing, PKI, and common coin Two-round all-to-all FixReceive and zombie detection -
definition General versus spotty send corruption
definedGeneral send corruption permits recipient-selective suppression, whereas spotty corruption requires all of a sender's still-undelivered messages in a round to be delivered or dropped together.
Synchronous network, corruption modes, strong rushing, PKI, and common coin
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analysis Why send faults are unexpectedly strong
proved and demonstratedSelective delivery can give honest and send-corrupt groups incompatible views while both groups' outputs remain constrained; threshold signatures, leader-election techniques, and time-lock-puzzle broadcast do not automatically repair this asymmetry.
Dolev-Strong lower bound, degradation, and failure of recent techniques -
method Consensus construction formally specified
The construction composes all-to-all FixReceive, weak broadcast, weak consensus, graded consensus, a common coin, and signed decision certificates in a repeated coin-loop.
Two-round all-to-all FixReceive and zombie detection Weak broadcast, weak consensus, and graded consensus Expected-constant-round protocol and general-send security theorem-
component All-to-all FixReceive
specified and provedParties send signed inputs, relay unique first-round messages, and become zombies if too few messages arrive; the proofs ensure a non-zombie party receives honest-origin traffic and propagates honest messages across live views.
Two-round all-to-all FixReceive and zombie detection -
component Graded-consensus bridge
specified and provedWeak-consensus outputs are weak-broadcast in parallel; a party chooses the majority bit and assigns grade one only after a large enough support threshold rules out a conflicting live grade-one output.
Weak broadcast, weak consensus, and graded consensus -
component Common-coin loop and certificates
assumes primitiveEach iteration combines graded consensus with a common coin; signed decision certificates propagate termination while preserving a single decision value.
Expected-constant-round protocol and general-send security theorem
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claim group Main results proved conditional
The full version proves validity, consistency, and expected termination under explicit threshold, synchrony, PKI/signature, and common-coin assumptions.
Expected-constant-round protocol and general-send security theorem Improved spotty-send threshold and matching impossibility-
theorem General-send threshold
proved conditionalTheorem 3 proves expected-constant-round consensus when n is greater than t_rcv + 2t_snd + 2t_byz, assuming the specified common coin is available.
Expected-constant-round protocol and general-send security theorem -
theorem Optimal spotty-send threshold
proved tightTheorems 4 and 5 establish sufficiency above, and impossibility at or below, n = t_rcv + t_snd + 2t_byz in the spotty-send model with zombies.
Improved spotty-send threshold and matching impossibility -
theorem Deterministic-round lower bound
inherited and reprovedThe Dolev-Strong neighboring-execution argument transfers to send corruptions, so deterministic authenticated broadcast tolerating t_snd send faults cannot finish in fewer than t_snd + 1 rounds.
Dolev-Strong lower bound, degradation, and failure of recent techniques
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evidence group Evidence and proof chain
formal paper proofsProtocol pseudocode, definitions, quorum arguments, reductions among consensus primitives, termination bounds, and a partition-style impossibility proof support the results; no machine-checked proof or implementation artifact is claimed.
Weak broadcast, weak consensus, and graded consensus Expected-constant-round protocol and general-send security theorem Improved spotty-send threshold and matching impossibility -
limitation group Limits and open questions
materialThe model is synchronous and uses authenticated channels, a PKI, signatures, and a common coin; optimal combined send/Byzantine tolerance for recipient-selective general send corruption remains unresolved.
Research question, thresholds, pathology, and open general-case optimality Synchronous network, corruption modes, strong rushing, PKI, and common coin Dolev-Strong lower bound, degradation, and failure of recent techniques -
artifact group Auditable resources
source availableA complete public ePrint supplies definitions, protocols, and proofs, while the Springer DOI and CISPA page establish publication identity; no executable artifact is represented.
Research question, thresholds, pathology, and open general-case optimality Official peer-reviewed publication record Author-affiliation summary and publication identity -
scrutiny External scrutiny
venue reviewedThe work appeared at ACNS 2022 and has a public full version. This audit did not locate public reviews, a machine-checked proof audit, a correction, or an independent reproduction.
Official peer-reviewed publication record Dated citation-count snapshot -
lineage Research lineage
documentedThe paper extends mixed crash/send/receive/Byzantine models, diagnoses why dishonest-majority broadcast techniques do not transfer directly, and reframes send corruption through the gap between general and spotty delivery.
Research question, thresholds, pathology, and open general-case optimality Dolev-Strong lower bound, degradation, and failure of recent techniques
Audit trail
Source index
Locators state the depth of the current audit. PDF page numbers, where present, are one-based file pages; metadata-, summary-, and abstract-bounded records explicitly identify their limitations.
- Research question, thresholds, pathology, and open general-case optimality Abstract and Sections 1.1-1.5, PDF pages 1-7
- Synchronous network, corruption modes, strong rushing, PKI, and common coin Sections 2.1-2.2, PDF pages 7-10
- Dolev-Strong lower bound, degradation, and failure of recent techniques Section 3, PDF pages 11-14
- Two-round all-to-all FixReceive and zombie detection Section 4.1 and Protocol 2, PDF pages 14-15
- Weak broadcast, weak consensus, and graded consensus Sections 4.2-4.4 and Protocols 3-5, PDF pages 15-21
- Expected-constant-round protocol and general-send security theorem Section 4.5, Theorem 3, Protocol 6, and Lemmas 7-11, PDF pages 22-26
- Improved spotty-send threshold and matching impossibility Section 5, Theorems 4-5, PDF pages 26-28
- Official peer-reviewed publication record ACNS 2022, DOI 10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_34
- Dated citation-count snapshot OpenAlex cited_by_count = 5, queried by DOI on 2026-07-11